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In recent years, tensions have escalated between actors in the South China Sea, one of 
which is the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the region’s primary 
intergovernmental organization. The purpose of this report is to determine the effectiveness of 
ASEAN in resolving the South China Sea disputes and to clarify how geopolitical factors have 
impacted the organization’s actions. Through an analysis of evolving maritime claims and the 
current state of affairs, this paper suggests that ASEAN must be involved in any attempt to 
resolve the conflict peacefully. Acknowledging the importance of the diplomatic channels that 
ASEAN has created to ease tensions, this paper argues that a US-Japan security alliance can help 
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 The South China Sea includes some of the most strategically important maritime territory 
in the world. Historically, these waters have been a source of tension between the People’s 
Republic of China and its neighbors, including Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. With many 
natural resource reserves and as a major shipping route across the region, the SCS serves as a 
new sphere of influence for Asian-Pacific countries in the 21st century.  
 Over the past few years, tensions in the SCS have escalated between actors, one of which 
is the Association for Southeast Asian Nations, the region's primary intergovernmental 
organization. These tensions have largely been shaped by China's growing assertiveness in the 
region. Control of the SCS would allow Beijing to dominate major trade and oil routes, 
potentially disrupting shipments to East and Southeast Asian countries. This control would 
effectively give China a new level of energy security and independence. As a result, this has 
raised questions about countries' security commitments, namely, the role of ASEAN.1  
Conflicts over control of the South China Sea challenge ASEAN’s ability to manage 
regional security, protect the economic and environmental interests of its members, and maintain 
its reputation as a credible international organization. Although a peaceful agreement would 
prove beneficial to all actors, intrastate competition over the region and resource allocation has 
complicated negotiation attempts. Despite differing attitudes and motivations within ASEAN 
member states and other regional powerhouses, it is important to analyze ASEAN’s actions in 
the political-security arena to suggest ways to improve its contribution to conflict resolution. 
The purpose of this report is to determine the effectiveness of ASEAN in resolving the 
South China Sea disputes and to clarify how geopolitical factors have impacted the 
organization’s actions. The scope of this paper examines the historical claims, economic 
                                                




objectives, and foreign policy interests at play in the territorial waters. Based on the available 
evidence, this paper suggests that ASEAN must be involved in any attempt to resolve the dispute 
peacefully. Furthermore, this report considers how a US-Japan security alliance can ensure a 
long-term solution to the conflict.  
The first section of this paper includes a review of relevant scholarly works in order to 
situate the topic in existing academic research and present the complexities of the region today. 
The subsequent section on research methodology explains how the information analysis was 
conducted. The third section provides a description of the various factors that matter in the South 
China Sea, including the strategic geopolitical importance of the region, customary international 
laws related to the disputes, and the strengths and weaknesses of ASEAN. The fourth and fifth 
sections trace the evolution of maritime claims, including attempts at resolution and ASEAN’s 
role in addressing the conflict. Then, I assess two potential approaches to resolving the dispute, 
both of which shed light on the region in the coming decade: 1) the effectiveness of ASEAN thus 
far and its continuing efforts to engage in dialogue with external actors, including China, and 2) 
the inclusion of a US-Japan security alliance in negotiations. After examining the future of the 
SCS, I conclude that the group should continue its role in maintaining stability in the region and 
take the lead in creating a peaceful consensus alongside the US and Japan.  
Literature Review 
 The East Asian economy has been at the forefront of research on Asia for decades, but 
the focus only turned to ASEAN in the 1990s, when China began its transition towards a market-
oriented economy. Likewise, rival countries have competed over claims in the SCS since the 
early 1900s, but in recent years, more attention has been paid to the region as tensions have 




the subsequent US political pivot to Asia in 2009. Many publications about the region use both 
qualitative and quantitative data to cover a range of topics, including different countries’ 
perspectives and the international forums that ASEAN has created. 
 Research organizations and academics around the world continue to write about different 
countries’ interests and their policies toward the South China Sea. Fangyin Zhou’s article, 
“Between Assertiveness and Self-Restraint: Understanding China’s South China Sea Policy,” in 
International Affairs provides a contemporary and comprehensive overview of China’s strategic 
goals in the area. He discusses China’s evolving strategy and assesses the dynamics of the 
relationship between China and ASEAN.2 Additionally, Joshua Rowan’s article, “The US-Japan 
Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Dispute,” for Asian Survey describes the 
interests of the US and Japan, and how an alliance between the two could operate in conjunction 
with ASEAN to create an effective long-term solution.3 This literature was helpful in analyzing 
the current state of affairs in the SCS and in determining how ASEAN can fit in with the agendas 
of China, the US, and Japan to resolve the disputes. 
 The main theoretical approach with which the South China Sea can be understood is 
through defensive realism, although liberalist and constructivist approaches also offer 
explanatory variables for the ongoing disputes. According to Jihyun Kim’s article, “Territorial 
Disputes in the South China Sea: Implications for Security in Asia and Beyond,” for Strategic 
Studies Quarterly, the future of East Asia and Sino-US relations is somewhat pessimistic due to 
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Policy,” International Affairs, Issue 92, No. 4. Accessed October 18, 2017. 
 
3 Joshua Rowan, “The US-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute,” Asian 





the nature of the security dilemma, a key component of defensive realism.4 This means that even 
if China does not seek to take over the entire South China Sea, it has an incentive to signal its 
influence and maintain its presence. As a result, China will continue to assert its influence in the 
SCS to gain resources, but will also pay attention to the movements of other actors and 
potentially compromise with other claimant states. In the face of perceived Chinese aggression, 
Southeast Asian states will protect their own interests. 
Despite the overwhelming amount of analysis on the East Asian economy and the major 
powers in the region, including China, Japan, and ASEAN, there exists limited research on the 
effectiveness of ASEAN as a direct mediator in the SCS disputes. In my opinion, much of the 
existing literature ignores the importance of the diplomatic channels that ASEAN has created to 
resolve the maritime conflict. This report attempts to bridge the gap by directly applying 
ASEAN’s diplomatic capabilities to address the issues in the South China Sea.  
Research Methodology 
 Security tensions in East and Southeast Asia have received much attention by experts 
over the past several decades. The primary data used for this paper were secondary sources from 
experts in Asian regionalism, maritime security, and ASEAN dynamics. Due to the vast amount 
of academic literature written on this subject, it was important to research East and Southeast 
Asian relations first in order to gain a better understanding of the individual stakes in the region. 
After developing a deeper understanding of the disputes among claimant states in 
Southeast Asia, I researched American and Japanese interests in the SCS that necessitate the 
countries’ involvement. Washington and Tokyo not only have an interest in maintaining their 
status in the region, but also ensuring that the dispute is resolved peacefully. Thus, American and 
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Japanese positions regarding the ongoing territorial disputes in the SCS and their relationships 
with ASEAN are worth exploring in greater detail. 
Twenty-one academic sources and several other websites were used to provide this paper 
with a range of information about the ongoing conflict. The United Nations Library in Geneva 
and Harvard University’s remote library made it possible to access these scholarly sources. The 
qualitative research obtained from these journals and documents was then analyzed in order to 
evaluate the effectiveness of ASEAN’s diplomatic role in the SCS and to assess the impact that 
external actors can have on the regional organization.  
The majority of the primary sources cited in this paper are interviews I conducted to gain 
the most up-to-date research concerning the geopolitics of East and Southeast Asia. Four in-
person interviews, in addition to two email interviews, were conducted during the fall of 2017. 
Interviewees were chosen based on their expertise in Asian-Pacific affairs and proximity to 
Geneva, Switzerland and Brussels, Belgium. Ethical considerations were made prior to each 
interview, with each interviewee giving their informed consent to be mentioned in this paper. 
Many of the interviewees also recommended books, journals, and authors, which are referenced 
throughout this report. 
OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
 In order to understand ASEAN’s role in the South China Sea, readers must first 
understand the geopolitical importance of the region and the international laws related to the 
disputes. Examining the origins of ASEAN and the organization’s strengths and weaknesses also 





 The South China Sea is a critical region because it serves the economic interests of the 
countries competing for claims. More specifically, the waters serve as a vital shipping lane for 
oil and Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) to China, Japan, South Korea, and others.5 It is the world’s 
second busiest international shipping lane, after the Strait of Hormuz.6 Additionally, about two-
thirds of South Korean, Japanese, and Taiwanese LNG supplies flow through this region.7  
 In addition to its significance as a shipping lane, the SCS region contains potentially vast 
oil reserves. A 2013 estimate of the region from the US Department of Energy reports that the 
SCS contains approximately 11 billion barrels worth of oil reserves.8 However, much of the 
region’s potential oil and natural gas reserves have been untapped and estimates vary greatly, as 
drilling for these resources has been discouraged by nations in the region.9 The UN estimates that 
the SCS alone accounts for approximately 10 percent of global fisheries production.10 On the 
other hand, China estimates that the potential oil resources of the Spratly and Paracel Islands 
could contain as much as 105 billion barrels of oil.11 Although many believe this is an 
overestimation, the 1993-1994 estimate by the US Geological Survey of 28 billion barrels 
                                                
5 US Energy Information Administration, “The South China Sea is an Important World Trade Route,” 
Independent Statistics and Analysis. Accessed October 1, 2017. 
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8 US Department of Energy, “South China Sea,” Country Analysis Briefs. Accessed October 18, 2017. 
 
9 Steve Mollman, “The South China Sea’s Untapped Oil and Natural Gas are Back in Focus,” Quartz. 
Accessed October 1, 2017. 
 
10 US Energy Information Administration, “The South China Sea is an Important World Trade Route,” 
Independent Statistics and Analysis. Accessed October 1, 2017. 
 
11 Joshua Rowan, “The US-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute,” Asian 





discovered and undiscovered reserves still provides a large financial incentive for states to 
control these islands and waters.12 
International Laws Related to the Dispute 
 
 Before describing ASEAN’s significance in the South China Sea, it is helpful to examine 
what laws govern the region. In 1982, the UN adopted the Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), which set out the current legal framework for ocean activities. Today, UNCLOS 
remains “the most recognizable” document regarding maritime disputes.13 
The Convention, which has 162 signatories, defines the maritime zones along a nation’s 
coastline, outlines the rights and responsibilities of a nation to protect the marine natural 
resources in its territory, and establishes rules for international navigation. It states that countries 
can extend their territory beyond 200 nautical miles, as long as they prove that their continental 
shelf is a natural continuation of their land territory.14 Moving forward, it is important to keep 
UNCLOS in mind as it sets the framework for further agreements to be made in this area.  
Explanation of ASEAN 
 ASEAN has played a significant role in the Asia-Pacific region as “a role model for 
international behavior” and as “a catalyst for constructive change.”15 Understanding ASEAN’s 
history, principles, limits, and advantages highlights the organization’s connection to the SCS 
dispute and why it is such a critical mediator in the conflict.  
                                                
12 Ibid. 
 
13 Joshua Rowan, “The US-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute,” Asian 
Survey, Vol. 45, No. 3, May/June 2005, 418. Accessed October 18, 2017.  
 
14 Convention on the Law of the Sea, New York, December 10, 1982, United Nations Treaty, 53. Accessed 
October 24, 2017. 
 
15 Shunmugam Jayakumar, “Opening Statement” (speech, 30th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala 





The intergovernmental organization was created in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. These nations were entangled in geopolitical competition 
between the US and the Soviet Union, and the two previous attempts at regional organization–
Maphilindo in 1963, and the Association of Southeast Asia in 1961–had both failed.16 
Deteriorating relations between Indonesia and Malaysia and the US escalation of the Vietnam 
War motivated actors to seek a permanent peace in Southeast Asia.  
ASEAN was not created as a mechanism for resolving disputes, nor to counterbalance 
external powers like China. Instead, its purpose was to create intra-regional cooperation and 
build confidence between its member states by persuading them “to behave in ways that bolster 
regional stability.”17 ASEAN's approach has been proven successful, as the organization has 
raised living standards for more than 600 million people.18 The group also organizes more than 
1,000 meetings each year on a broad range of topics, resulting in a regional culture of 
musyawarah and mufakat ("consultation” and “consensus" in Indonesian).19 
ASEAN’s policy of nonintervention is at the core of its mission. Essentially, this means 
that ASEAN member states avoid criticizing one another and avoid meddling in one another’s 
domestic affairs. This approach has been effective in managing the Thai-Cambodia border 
dispute, as well as the conflict over the Sabah area between Malaysia and the Philippines. 
Additionally, a look at the region illustrates that the last war was the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in 
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18 Kishore Mahbubani, “ASEAN: The Way Forward,” McKinsey & Company, 1. Accessed November 6, 
2017.  
 
19 Quang Minh Pham, “The South China Sea Security Problem: Towards Regional Cooperation,” Asia 





1979. This war, which happened almost four decades ago, is a sign that ASEAN has been 
successful in maintaining peace in the region.20 
 Yet, despite ASEAN’s success, the organization has several shortcomings, most of which 
stem from China’s influence in the region. Most notably, ASEAN is a collection of states with 
varying interests and capabilities, situated in a larger and complex Asian strategic 
neighborhood.21 Only four of the ten member states-–Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia–have ongoing disputes with China over the SCS. Thus, many of the member states 
without a direct stake in the territorial waters are opposed to standing against China.22 This 
makes sense as many non-claimant states, such as Cambodia, are extremely close to China and 
need the larger power’s support, and therefore, are unwilling to take a more unified position in 
the SCS with ASEAN.23 
 Another related weakness of ASEAN is the issue of finding a common position on the 
PRC’s policies and actions. China’s commercial influence is very strong in Cambodia, Laos, and 
Myanmar (CLM), which prevents ASEAN from forming a united position.24 Moreover, some 
other ASEAN states, including the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam have recently aligned 
themselves with China as a result of the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership–a 
crucial part of the US pivot to Asia, which now seems in doubt.25 
                                                
20 Suddha Chakravartti, interview by Jennifer Li, Hotel Warwick Cafe Geneva, November 6, 2017. 
 
21 Nicholas Khoo, “ASEAN’s Relations With the Great Powers in the Post-Cold War Era: Challenges and 
Opportunities.” Asia New Zealand Foundation, March 2016, 4. Accessed October 18, 2017. 
 
22 Zachary Keck, “Solving Intra-ASEAN South China Sea Disputes,” The Diplomat. Accessed October 31, 
2017. 
 
23 Lionel Fatton, interview by Jennifer Li, Webster University Geneva, November 1, 2017. 
 
24 Robin Ramcharan, email interview by Jennifer Li, November 9, 2017. 
 





 A third weakness of ASEAN is that it does not have the capacity to deal with Chinese 
military power. Although ASEAN’s ten member states form an economic powerhouse with a 
combined GDP of $2.4 trillion, the region has yet to develop its human capital and military 
capabilities.26 Furthermore, trade interdependence between ASEAN and the PRC will continue 
to deepen, giving the latter continued leverage in the region.27  
Despite these challenges, ASEAN’s ability to both embed itself within the wider Asia-
Pacific context and bring key players, including China and Japan, to the table are important 
accomplishments and critical to its continued relevance. ASEAN's dialogic, consensual, and 
“relaxed” nature has contributed to regional stability by creating norms and an environment to 
address shared challenges. Therefore, ASEAN will continue to play a major role in mediating the 
South China Sea conflict, as well as shaping the region’s political, economic, and security 
architecture in the 21st century. 
EVOLUTION OF MARITIME CLAIMS 
 The following section analyzes the evolving character of the South China Sea disputes, 
which is key to determining ASEAN’s role. Significant attention is placed on previous attempts 
at resolution and claims made by the nations surrounding the SCS region. 
Attempts at Resolution 
 While tensions still run high between claimant states and other relevant actors, some 
steps have been taken to resolve the conflict. This includes ASEAN’s lead in creating 
mechanisms for relevant actors to come together, the 2016 Philippines case, and China’s new 
willingness to sign a binding code of conduct (COC) to handle territorial claims in the SCS.  
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ASEAN has arguably been most successful in promoting dialogue with relevant actors, 
especially China. It has initiated a set of mechanisms and processes in which strategic players 
can participate, including the development of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994 for political 
and security dialogue, the East Asia Summit, which involves the ASEAN-10, and the Asia-
Europe Meeting with the European Union and ASEAN +3. As a result, ASEAN has provided a 
platform for countries to discuss issues, while building trust among one another.28 
This approach of creating a discussion space for the SCS issue has shaped China’s 
behavior in the region. Specifically, China has valued ASEAN support in developing its regional 
role. In turn, ASEAN has benefitted greatly from continued investment of Chinese groups in 
Southeast Asia. It is evident that over the past decade, ASEAN-China relations have improved 
and ASEAN’s new strategy of constructive engagement has been mutually beneficial.29 
Another factor that has attempted to resolve the disputes is the Philippines-China court 
case. In 2013, the Philippines submitted a case against the PRC to the International Court of 
Justice’s Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, challenging China’s nine-dashed line 
claim and other actions taken in the disputed area. The nine-dash line refers to the PRC territorial 
claim that encompasses a major part of the SCS, such as the Paracel and Spratly Islands.30 
On July 12th, 2016, the International Court ruled in favor of the Philippines, stating that 
while Chinese navigators and fishermen had historically made use of the islands, there was no 
evidence that the country had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or their 
resources. Thus, the Tribunal concluded that China had no “historic rights to resources within the 
                                                
28 Carolina Hernandez, “ASEAN’s China Strategy Towards a Regional Order,” 3rd Berlin Conference on 
Asian Security, 17-19 September 2008, 2. Accessed November 3, 2017. 
 
29 Ibid., 5. 
 
30 “The South China Sea Arbitration” (press release on Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, The Hague, 





sea areas” on the nine-dashed line map.31 This ruling was a huge victory for the Philippines and a 
strong basis for the future settlement of disputes in the region. Although China has since rejected 
the ruling, the case “helped soften China’s position vis à vis ASEAN claimants.”32 
More recently, China’s backing of a legally-binding code of conduct framework with 
ASEAN has been a major step in resolving the disputes. A COC is a regulatory instrument with 
“a written set of rules and principles which...focuses on a certain desirable conduct of the 
addressees.”33 Although China and ASEAN previously signed the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the SCS in 2002, which required all parties “to exercise self-restraint” with regard to 
“activities that would complicate or escalate disputes,” this agreement was legally non-binding. 
As a result, the 2002 COC did not stop claimants from carrying out construction and oil 
exploration in disputed areas, and did not prevent China from building man-made islands in the 
controversial waters. Thus, the 2002 declaration on conduct has not been effective.34  
China’s new stance and willingness to work with ASEAN to create a legally-binding and 
enforceable code for the disputed SCS could help stabilize the region. The pact represents “a new 
starting point to jointly build a sea of peace, stability, and prosperity.”35 However, if previous 
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32 Robin Ramcharan, email interview by Jennifer Li, November 9, 2017. 
 
33 “Definition: Codes of Conduct,” Oxford Public International Law. Accessed October 24, 2017. 
 
34 Peter Dutton, “Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China and the South China Sea,” Naval War 
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35 Jerome Morales, “South China Sea Code of Conduct Talks to be ‘Stabilizer’ for Region: China Premier,” 





agreements that China has agreed to are any indication, the emergence of this COC will involve 
tough negotiations that is “many diplomatic hard yards away.”36 
Current State of Affairs 
 This section expands on the broadening range of stakeholders and international actors 
that are influencing the development of the South China Sea. Today, the SCS faces conflict not 
only between ASEAN and China, but between ASEAN members as well. Certain member states, 
including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, have conflicting claims on different 
islands and territorial boundaries, and have been reluctant to compromise.  
For example, Vietnam holds one of the largest claims in the SCS: it claims the entire 
Spratly Island chain and includes the Paracel Islands in its territorial waters, despite the latter’s 
seizure by China in 1976. The current Vietnamese government bases its claims according to 
court documents during the Le Thanh Tong dynasty and also argues that the islands are part of 
its continental shelf, in accordance with UNCLOS provisions. Today, Hanoi and Beijing 
continue to clash over conflicting oil claims regarding territory in the SCS. The Philippines’ 
claim to the Spratly Islands is also rooted in history, when Filipino businessman Tomas Cloma 
established a settlement on eight islands of the Spratly Island chain in 1956. Since then, the 
Philippines has maintained that geographically, all of its claims lie within its territory and 
therefore, does not violate UNCLOS. Indonesia has modest territorial claims in the SCS. 
However, Jakarta does not claim any part of the Spratly or the Paracel Islands, and instead, 
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asserts a 200-mile exclusive economic zone under UNCLOS. Similarly, Malaysia uses the 
continental shelf theory to justify its claims for 12 islands in the SCS.37 
China complicates these claims with its nine-dashed line, which marks off nearly the 
entire sea as its own territory. Beijing views the SCS and its major trade route as an integral part 
of its external security, an attitude which has dictated China’s actions in the region, including the 
building of military bases on islands and the creation of artificial islands on coral reefs.38 
As a result of China’s heavy influence in the region and ASEAN’s inability to form a 
consensus due to competing national self-interests, it has been challenging to find an equitable 
solution.39 Therefore, tensions will continue to heighten between ASEAN and the PRC, as well 
as between ASEAN member states. Thus, it is critical to take these historic claims into account 
in order to suggest ways to improve ASEAN’s role in managing the disputes. 
ROLE OF ASEAN IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
 The complexity and ambiguity of the conflicting claims in the South China Sea, coupled 
with the economic stakes that lie in the territorial waters, have halted the creation of a lasting 
solution. However, the fact that positions continue to vary may allow flexibility in future 
negotiations. The following section describes a variety of approaches to finding an equitable 
solution. This includes an analysis of ASEAN’s role as the main intergovernmental organization 
in the region and the involvement of a US-Japan security alliance as a forum for dialogue and 
negotiation. By assessing ASEAN’s actions in the political-security arena with regard to the SCS 
disputes, the findings can be useful in predicting the future of the territorial claims.  
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 Today, ASEAN is the only regional organization in Southeast Asia with ten official 
members. It is also the main counterweight to China’s presence in the region.40 With five trillion 
dollars in trade passing through the SCS each year, ASEAN is responsible for protecting the 
economic interests of its member states through peaceful negotiation and other political 
measures.41 Currently, ASEAN does not have a collective security mechanism. However, 
ASEAN’s recent success in obtaining China’s signature for a binding code of conduct in the 
South China Sea is evidence of the regional organization’s progress. The organization must 
continue to protect the basic securities for ASEAN citizens by adapting to the region’s changing 
political context and challenges.  
 ASEAN can also lead the way for regional cooperation and be an anchor for other 
countries to build a more effective and focused organization. The fact that there currently exists a 
division between the countries that has not affected the creation of international forums proves 
that ASEAN is a more stable entity than the EU.42  Thanks to ASEAN, Asia has seen a 
proliferation of forums where countries can communicate openly, which helps build trust. As a 
result, ASEAN can use its status to influence the politics of the region in the future. 
 As a key element of East Asia’s postwar structure, the SCS dispute is a “critical test 
demanding ASEAN to modify itself in order to confront the increasingly aggressive China.”43 
Over the course of its history, ASEAN has accumulated more political influence and has 
emerged as a new player in regional economic and security activities. Specifically, the group 
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enjoyed a “golden” period during the 1990s and early 2000s by successfully promoting regional 
economic development and mediating conflicts among member states. Also during this time, 
ASEAN maintained friendly relations with Beijing, allowing China to become an important 
partner and source of balance for ASEAN against the US.44  
With a united front, ASEAN can have a stronger position in negotiating economic 
agreements with China and other actors. ASEAN should be integrated as much as possible into 
the economics of the region for mutual benefit and to provide a platform for great power 
politics.45 However, if ASEAN countries negotiate individually, they lose almost all leverage, as 
their small sizes put them “on the back foot with economic powerhouses, such as China.”46 
 In sum, failing to maintain regional security and provide an environment where claimant 
stakes can discuss negotiations regarding the SCS disputes would cause ASEAN to lose its 
credibility as an effective regional organization on an international level. Therefore, as China 
continues to change its position and ambitions in the region, ASEAN also needs to adapt to the 
new political context and continue to promote dialogue between claimant members.  
POTENTIAL APPROACHES TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
With regard to conflict management in the South China Sea, ASEAN has had several  
approaches. On the one hand, it has attempted to resolve the problem legally and through 
mediation workshops, which has increased the organization’s prestige. Most notably, ASEAN 
brought all disputants together in 2002 to agree to the Declaration of Conduct. On the other hand, 
it has tried to create a balance of power by establishing connections with small countries in order 
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to prevent China from dominating them. However, ASEAN still faces many challenges from 
both internal and external factors, which have consequently limited ASEAN’s role in the SCS.47 
Effectiveness of ASEAN 
ASEAN has already shown an impressive ability to maintain regional stability and 
overcome political tensions and difficulties to form strong strategic partnerships. However, while 
the regional organization continues to raise its voice in conflict resolution matters, its efficiency 
is still under much debate.  
 All parties involved in the SCS disputes view ASEAN as a vehicle to achieve their goals. 
Even China, which has acted as a “spoiler” to ASEAN’s proposals, has an incentive to use 
ASEAN as a tool for conflict resolution.48 For example, China can use its close relations with 
Indonesia and Cambodia to break the consensus mechanism of ASEAN to benefit itself. For 
small countries, ASEAN serves as a representative to protect their economic interests. In 
particular, ASEAN advocates for a legal resolution and peaceful settlement through dialogue 
between claimants, which member states like Vietnam support. ASEAN is at the center of 
bringing all disputants into agreement and should continue to act as a mediator of the conflict.49  
 Yet, the regional organization faces obstacles with its member states’ conflicting 
interests. Composed of ten developing countries with varying interests and abilities, political, 
economic, and military limitations constrain ASEAN’s ability to respond to the maritime 
conflict. This internal division within ASEAN has posed a threat to ASEAN’s solidarity.50 In the 
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evolving context of the South China Sea, ASEAN must seek ways to unite its members, or at 
least, the major claimant states. Doing so would improve ASEAN’s status in the region and its 
ability to influence other actors.51 
US-Japan Security Alliance 
 Given that ASEAN cannot resolve the conflict over the South China Sea alone, the group 
should turn to the US and Japan, both of which have significant interests in the region and can 
provide ASEAN with support in building a long-term solution. Although the US is 
geographically far from the disputes, two of its allies–South Korea and Japan–depend on the 
SCS. The US is also engaged in several drilling projects in the controversial waters and has an 
interest in ensuring the SCS remains open for freedom of navigation. Historically, Japan has also 
been active in the SCS both as a shipping route for oil and a mechanism to increase Tokyo’s 
influence in East Asia.52 
 To ensure long-term stability in the South China, a US-Japan security alliance must be 
involved for a variety of reasons. First, the US Navy is the only reliable guarantor of freedom of 
navigation in Asia and enforcer of future China-ASEAN agreements. This is because other 
claimant states do not have sufficient military capabilities to deal with future violations of 
treaties by the PRC. Furthermore, ASEAN does not have a standing army or navy to ensure 
compliance with regulatory agreements. As a resident power in the area and as a non-claimant 
state, the US can also highlight violations of state sovereignty and breaches in treaties using soft 
power through the UN Security Council. On the other hand, Japan can demand countries in 
Southeast Asia withdraw their military personnel stationed in the SCS because of its power as a 
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large foreign aid donor to the region. Therefore, this alliance, along with ASEAN’s established 
diplomatic channels, can create a peaceful solution to the existing disputes.53 
FUTURE OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
 The future of the South China Sea, especially the involvement of ASEAN, is uncertain. 
However, it is evident that competition for resources through oil exploration or fisheries will 
likely continue and add to the conflict. As a result, it is extremely important for ASEAN to keep 
stability in the region and strike a balance between competing powers.  
Importance of a Peaceful Settlement 
 In the absence of a resolution of the disputes, it is important to sustain peaceful 
settlement. All claimant states are committed to finding a peaceful resolution, an attitude which 
stems from their commitment to the Law of the Sea treaty.54 A peaceful settlement should be an 
integral part of ASEAN’s campaign to resolve the territorial conflicts. “Without the goal of 
peace, then ASEAN will disintegrate fundamentally as an organization.”55 
The new Code of Conduct that China recently agreed to sign is a step in the right 
direction, and goes hand-in-hand with the goal of maintaining a peaceful region. “It is a must to 
avoid unexpected events and escalation.”56 Despite this commitment, however, all parties still 
need to have the political will to come to the negotiating table. Only after achieving these two 
conditions can ASEAN be useful in developing strategies to both stabilize and mediate conflict.  
Resolving Bilateral Issues First, then Pursuing Multilateral Negotiations 
                                                
53 Ibid., 435.  
 
54 Robin Ramcharan, email interview by Jennifer Li, November 9, 2017. 
 







 Once all parties reinforce their commitment to a peaceful settlement, the next step is to 
break down the relations between ASEAN and the PRC, as well as between ASEAN member 
states. Smaller claimants in the SCS have historically been reluctant to pursue bilateral 
negotiations with larger states for fear that a larger state would overpower them. Similarly, China 
has been unwilling to pursue multilateral discussions in an official setting, instead preferring to 
get involved in bilateral negotiations. 
 Given the resistance of China to come to a multi-party negotiating table and recent 
enhanced cohesiveness among ASEAN claimants, perhaps now is the time to initiate bilateral 
negotiations to resolve disputes in areas of the SCS where there are not multiple claimants.57 If 
bilateral negotiations were successful in areas where there are only two claimants, then these 
agreements could eliminate significant portions of the SCS under dispute. Furthermore, their 
success may create a domino effect of countries settling disputes with China, and potentially, 
“sufficient momentum toward a multilateral solution to areas where there are multiple claims.”58  
ASEAN and Multilateralism: The Way Ahead 
A combination of bilateral and regional cooperation is needed, as well as a more 
globalized approach, to achieve compromise. In an interview, Dr. Chakravartti explained how 
the SCS conflict is like a chessboard. If one country makes a move, there will be counteraction 
from Chinese officials.  
Known as the “best negotiating power between big powers,” ASEAN must play the 
balancing game amongst its resident powers and its neighbors, including Japan and the US.59 
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ASEAN needs Japan and the US to balance against the Chinese influence. The US is a resident 
power in Southeast Asia, which China accepts. Therefore, the US deserves to have a say in the 
conversation, whether it it as an observer or in an actionary role. The US must also be involved 
as a counterweight. Realistically, a country to has to put a limit on China, and the US seems like 
the only country capable of doing so.60 Although China will not likely match the US and Japan 
militarily in the coming years, Chinese commercial influence is very powerful, especially in the 
CLM countries.61 Furthermore, Washington can help shed light on the issue internationally, 
demonstrating that the international legal structure, including UNCLOS, must be respected.  
 Japan, like the US, can also balance against China because of its strong interest in 
defending open sea lanes in the SCS and its desire to maintain access to maritime trade routes. 
Without SCS trade from the SCS, Japan would essentially be isolated. This partially explains 
why Japan is trying to attract powers, such as India and Australia, to help them form a coalition 
against China. Japan’s willingness to work with Indian and Australian interests signals that the 
country wants to work with US allies and gain the US’ support. Undermining China’s approach 
to the SCS could also lead to a more favorable outcome for the Japanese in the East China Sea.62 
CONCLUSION 
ASEAN clearly faces a challenge on the South China Sea issue. The organization’s 
members pride themselves on their ability to take a strategic view to the management of its 
regional order. However, the region is characterized by protracted inter- and intrastate 
competition over control of the territory and resource allocation, which has hindered negotiation 
attempts to produce an official agreement. Furthermore, the uncoordination and lack of bilateral 
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and multilateral discussions between states has only caused tensions in the region to escalate. 
The failure of ASEAN to create a lasting agreement will only lead to institutional paralysis on 
this issue. Without an overall agreement, there will continue to be protracted conflict between 
relevant states in the SCS. Operating on different agendas, and driven by varying and often 
incompatible motivations and ideologies, these nations will continue to deal with maritime 
tensions in a way that is damaging to regional stability and cooperation. 
 The South China Sea issue is an opportunity for ASEAN to test its widely celebrated 
conflict resolution practices. The task for ASEAN, or at least its key members with high stakes in 
the conflict, is to continue engaging other claimants in dialogue, build consensus, and retain its 
looseness. Thanks to these conversations, ASEAN has been able to build norms and bring major 
powers to the negotiating table to discuss the SCS conflict–and this has made a significant 
contribution to the peace and stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region. 
 Despite ASEAN’s accomplishments, it seems highly unlikely that ASEAN will be able to 
effectively resolve the issue over the SCS by itself. While many countries see the new China-
ASEAN South China Sea code of conduct as key to promoting peace and stability in the region, 
the involvement of other external actors, such as the US and Japan, is needed to balance against 
China. Given China’s relative size and capabilities compared to ASEAN member states, the 
participation of other Asia-Pacific economic powers seems to be a way to resolve the issues at 
hand in a manner that takes into account ASEAN states’ interests and is in accordance with 
international law. Yet, the involvement of international organizations and states, specifically, the 
US-Japan security alliance, alone will not suffice to resolve the maritime conflict. ASEAN must 
take an active role in incorporating the US and Japan into its established diplomatic channels to 




LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ASEAN- Association for Southeast Asian Nations  
ASEAN +3- Association for Southeast Asian Countries Plus China, Japan, and South Korea 
CLM- Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar 
COC- Code of Conduct 
EU- European Union 
LNG- Local Natural Gas 
PRC- People’s Republic of China 
SCS- South China Sea 
UN- United Nations 

















Buszynski, Leszek. “Rising Tensions in the South China Sea: Prospects for a Resolution of the 
Issue.” Security Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 2, Winter 2010, 91-101. Accessed October 31, 
2017. 
 
Buszynski, Leszek. “ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct, and the South China Sea.” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 25, No. 3, December 2003, 357. Accessed November 
3, 2017. 
 
Chakravartti, Suddha. Hotel Warwick Cafe Geneva. Formal interview by Jennifer Li. November 
6, 2017. 
 
Cochard, Sebastien. Email interview by Jennifer Li. September 28, 2017. 
 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, New York, December 10, 1982, United Nations Treaty, 53. 
Accessed October 24, 2017. 
 
Cook, Malcolm and Nick Bisley. “Contested Asia and the East Asia Summit.” Perspective, No. 
46 (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2016). 1-7. Accessed October 2, 2017. 
 
“Definition: Codes of Conduct.” Oxford Public International Law. Accessed October 24, 2017. 
 
Dutton, Peter.“Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China and the South China Sea.” Naval 
War College Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, Autumn 2011, 42. Accessed October 31, 2017. 
 
Egberink, Fenna. “ASEAN, China’s Rise, and Geopolitical Stability in Asia.” Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations, Clingendael Papers No. 2, April 2011, 30. Accessed 
October 31, 2017. 
 
Fatton, Lionel. Webster University Geneva. Formal interview by Jennifer Li. November 1, 2017. 
 
Foppiani, Oreste. Webster University Geneva. Formal interview by Jennifer Li. November 6, 
2017. 
 
Gallagher, Michael. “China’s Illusory Threat to the South China Sea.” International Security, 
Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer 1994, 169-194. 
 
Hernandez, Carolina. “ASEAN’s China Strategy Towards a Regional Order.” 3rd Berlin 
Conference on Asian Security, 17-19 September 2008, 2-5. Accessed November 3, 2017. 
 
Jayakumar, Shunmugam. “Opening Statement.” Speech at the 30th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, July 24, 1997. Accessed October 24, 2017. 
 
Jho, Whasun and Soo A. Chae. “Hegemonic Disputes and the Limits of the ASEAN Regional 





Kasahara, Shigehisa. International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam 
in The Hague. Formal interview by Jennifer Li. November 3, 2017. 
 
Keck, Zachary. “Solving Intra-ASEAN South China Sea Disputes.” The Diplomat. Accessed 
October 31, 2017. https://thediplomat.com/2014/05/solving-intra-asean-south-china-sea-
disputes/ 
 
Khoo, Nicholas. “ASEAN’s Relations With the Great Powers in the Post-Cold War Era: 
Challenges and Opportunities.” Asia New Zealand Foundation, March 2016, 4. Accessed 
October 18, 2017. 
 
Khoury, Elie. “Recent Trends in the South China Sea Disputes.” Institut de Relations 
Internationales et Stratégiques, Asia Focus #16. Accessed October 2, 2017. 
 
Kim, Jihyun. “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Implications for Security in Asia and 
Beyond.” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2015, 112. Accessed October 24, 
2017. 
 
Mahbubani, Kishore. “ASEAN: The Way Forward.” McKinsey & Company, 1-3. Accessed 
November 6, 2017. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-
insights/asean-the-way-forward 
 
Kurlantzick, Joshua. “The ASEAN-China Breakthrough in the South China Sea That Wasn’t.” 
World Politics Review (2017). Accessed October 2, 2017.  
 
Mollman, Steve. “The South China Sea’s Untapped Oil and Natural Gas are Back in Focus.” 
Quartz. Accessed October 1, 2017. https://qz.com/1037896/south-china-seas-untapped-
oil-and-natural-gas-back-in-focus/ 
 
Morales, Jerome. “South China Sea Code of Conduct Talks to be ‘Stabilizer’ for Region: China 




Pant, Harsh. “Take Note: Asia’s ‘Quad’ Is Back.” The Diplomat. Accessed November 10, 2017. 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/take-note-asias-quad-is-back/ 
 




Pham, Quang Minh. “The South China Sea Security Problem: Towards Regional Cooperation.” 






Ramcharan, Robin. Email interview by Jennifer Li. November 9, 2017. 
 
Roth, Hans. "The Dynamics of Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia.” The Geneva Centre for 
Security Policy. Research Series no. 14, 2015, 1-33. Accessed October 24, 2017.  
 
Rowan, Joshua. “The US-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute.” 
Asian Survey, Vol. 45, No. 3, May/June 2005, 414-435. Accessed October 18, 2017. 
 
Sharpe, Samuel. “An ASEAN Way to Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia?” The Pacific 
Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, March 1, 2003, 233. Accessed October 31, 2017. 
 
Simon, Sheldon. “ASEAN and Multilateralism: The Long, Bumpy Road to Community.” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 30, No. 3, August 2008, 264. Accessed October 24, 
2017. 
 
Smith, Stephen Wakefield. “ASEAN, China, and the South China Sea: Between a Rock and a 
Low-Tide Elevation.” University of San Francisco Maritime Law Journal 29, no. 1, 
2016-2017, 29-42. 
 
Snyder, Scott. “The South China Sea Dispute: Prospects for Preventive Diplomacy.” United 
States Institute of Peace, Special Report No. 18, August 1996, 9. Accessed November 1, 
2017. 
 
“The South China Sea Arbitration.” Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, 12 July 2016.  
 
Tong, Linh. “The ASEAN Crisis, Part 1: Why the South China Sea Is A Critical Test.” The 
Diplomat. Accessed October 24, 2017. https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/the-asean-crisis-
part-1-why-the-south-china-sea-is-a-critical-test/ 
 





US Energy Information Administration. “The South China Sea is an Important World Trade 
Route.” Independent Statistics and Analysis. Accessed October 1, 2017. 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=10671 
 
Venzon, Cliff, “China, ASEAN Still Far from South China Sea Code of Conduct.” Nikkei Asian 
Review, November 17, 2017. Accessed November 18, 2017. 
 
Yeo, Lay Hwee. “Japan, ASEAN, and the Construction of an East Asian Community.” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 28, No. 2, August 2006, 259-275. 
 
Zhou, Fangyin. “Between Assertiveness and Self-Restraint: Understanding China’s South China 
Sea Policy.” International Affairs, Issue 92, No. 4. Accessed October 18, 2017. 
